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I. INTRODUCTIONTHE remedy of mandamus is available in the Texas Supreme Court
only in limited circumstances.' This article focuses on opinions in-
volving the availability of mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse
of discretion by a lower court when there is no adequate remedy by ap-
peal.2 The purpose of this article is to analyze, summarize, and categorize
the sixteen published Texas Supreme Court mandamus opinions of that
type delivered from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2012, to iden-
tify and describe current standards and methods of analysis.3
Additionally, this article places particular focus on the supreme court's
treatment of the element of no adequate remedy by appeal. As demon-
strated by the sixteen cases described herein, the supreme court has not
identified definitive rules for determining whether an appellate remedy is
"adequate."4 Indeed, that court has stated that "rigid rules are necessarily
inconsistent with the flexibility that is the [mandamus] remedy's principal
virtue."5 Further, the supreme court has not indicated any change to its
expressed view that the determination of whether a remedy by appeal is
adequate is not a "formulaic one," but rather is "practical and pruden-
tial" and "resists categorization." 6 Nevertheless, while the opinions de-
scribed below vary in the amount and depth of analysis of whether the
appellate remedy is adequate, the supreme court's conclusions appear
consistent with prior cases involving similar underlying fact situations.
Mandamus statistics for the supreme court's 2011 fiscal year, which ran
from September 1, 2010, to August 31, 2011, show 227 new petitions for
writ of mandamus were filed with the supreme court. Dispositions were
made in 222 mandamus cases. 7 In 71.17%, or 158, of those dispositions,
the petition for writ of mandamus was denied, and in 8.55%, or nineteen,
1. In addition to the category of cases addressed in this article, mandamus relief may
be proper respecting a ministerial act of a court or public officer, see In re Allen, 366
S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. 2012) (involving a relator seeking to compel a state comptroller to
pay compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment); a duty relating to an elec-
tion, see TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (West 2010) ("The supreme court or a court of
appeals may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by
law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless
of whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer."); or review
of certain statutes, see In re Nestle USA, Inc., No. 12-0518, 2012 WL 5073315, at *1, *4
(Tex. Oct. 19, 2012) (mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute was
proper where legislature used language that gave supreme court power for such review).
2. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004).
3. For a survey of supreme court mandamus opinions of the same type issued from
November 1, 2009, through December 31, 2010, see Douglas S. Lang, Pamela D. Koebler,
& Genevra M. Williams, Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 64 SMU L.
REv. 393 (2011).
4. See In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generally Supreme Court Activity: FY 2007-2011, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http://
www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2011/sc/2-sc-activity.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
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of those dispositions, the petition was conditionally granted.8 During the
2012 fiscal year, which ran from September 1, 2011, to August 31, 2012,
214 new petitions for writ of mandamus were filed with the supreme
court and dispositions were made in 221 mandamus cases. 9 The petition
for writ of mandamus was denied in 73%, or 161, of those dispositions,
and was conditionally granted in 6.3%, or fourteen, of those disposi-
tions. 10 These statistics indicate that the supreme court continues to view
mandamus as an extraordinary remedy limited to "significant rulings in
exceptional cases."" Further, when compared with statistics for the 2010
fiscal year,12 these figures indicate a decrease in the number of new peti-
tions for writ of mandamus over the past three years and in the percent-
age of dispositions in which the writ was conditionally granted.
During the Survey period addressed in this article, from January 1,
2011, through December 31, 2012, the supreme court issued twenty-three
opinions involving petitions for mandamus relief.13 Sixteen of those
twenty-three opinions fell within the scope of this article in that the party
seeking relief claimed an abuse of discretion by a lower court and no
adequate remedy by appeal.14 Oral argument was heard by the supreme
8. See id. Cases otherwise disposed of were generally dismissed.
9. See Supreme Court Activity: FY 2008-2012, TEX. COURTS ONLINE, http://www
.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2012/sc/2-sc-activity.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). Dispositions
for a given fiscal year can include cases pending at the start of the fiscal year and therefore
can exceed the number of new cases added.
10. See id.
11. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136; see In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2009) ("mandamus review remains discretion-
ary, not of right").
12. During fiscal year 2010, 276 new petitions for writ of mandamus were filed with
the supreme court, while 288 mandamus cases were disposed of. The petition for writ of
mandamus was denied in 69%, or 199 of those dispositions, and was conditionally granted
in 10.4%, or thirty of those dispositions. See Supreme Court Activity: FY 2000-2010, TEX.
COURTS ONLINE, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2010/sc/2-sc-activity.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2013).
13. See In re Dean, 343 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. 2012); In re Nestle USA., Inc., No. 12-0518,
2012 WL 5073315 (Tex. Oct. 19, 2012); In re Uresti, 377 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. 2012); In re
United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373
S.W.3d 46 (Tex. 2012); In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. 2012); In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696
(Tex. 2012); In re Palomo, 366 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2012); In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361
S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2012); In re Nestle USA, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2012); In re Serv.
Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2011); In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. 2011);
In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. 2011); In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455
(Tex. 2011); In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2011); In re Guaranty Ins. Servs., Inc., 343
S.W.3d 130 (Tex. 2011); In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2011); In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932
(Tex. 2011); In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011); In re Universal Underwriters of Tex.
Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011); In re Does, 337 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011); In re Rubiola,
334 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2011); In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. 2011).
14. See In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685; In
re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46; In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174; In re Frank Kent
Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628; In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d 655; In re Serv. Corp. Int'l,
355 S.W.3d 662; In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493; In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611; In re Guaranty
Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130; In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301; In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932; In
re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360; In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404; In
re Does, 337 S.W.3d 862; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220. The other seven opinions dealt
with (1) ministerial acts of public officers, see In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696; In re Nestle USA,
Inc., 359 S.W.3d 207; In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455; In re Smith, 333
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court in seven of those sixteen cases.15 In fourteen of those sixteen opin-
ions, the petition for writ of mandamus was granted in full or in part. The
petition for writ of mandamus was denied in only two of those cases. 16
Part II of this article, Mandamus Fundamentals, provides a brief over-
view of the statutory jurisdiction and standard of proof for mandamus. In
Part III of this article, Categorization of Recent Texas Supreme Court
Mandamus Cases, we categorize and describe each of the sixteen manda-
mus opinions that are the focus of this article. The descriptions provide a
basis for comparison of the supreme court's treatment regarding the stan-
dard of proof in particular categories of cases. In Part IV we address the
supreme court's approach to analyzing the adequacy of an appellate rem-
edy in those sixteen cases. The cases show that the supreme court's treat-
ment of that element ranges from specific discussion and analysis, to
conclusory statements, to no mention at all. However, regardless of the
level of analysis, the outcomes are not inconsistent. Further, those cases
demonstrate that mandamus remains an extraordinary remedy granted
sparingly.17
II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
We begin with a brief overview of the fundamentals of mandamus. The
Texas Constitution, Texas Government Code, and various other statutes
provide the basis for statutory jurisdiction over writs of mandamus.18 Pur-
suant to the government code, each of Texas's fourteen courts of appeals
''may issue a writ of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce
the jurisdiction of the court." 19 Further, the courts of appeals may issue
writs of mandamus respecting certain district and county court judges or
the performance of certain election duties.20 The Texas Supreme Court
has mandamus jurisdiction concurrent with the courts of appeals as to
district and county court judges and election duties. 21 Additionally, the
supreme court may issue writs of mandamus (1) respecting Texas execu-
tive offices; (2) to "compel the performance of a judicial, ministerial, or
discretionary act or duty that, by state law, the officer or officers are au-
S.W.3d 582; (2) duties relating to an election, see In re Uresti, 377 S.W.3d 696; In re
Palomo, 366 S.W.3d 193; or (3) review of a statute that contained language granting man-
damus review, see In re Nestle USA., Inc., 2012 WL 5073315.
15. See In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685; In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373
S.W.3d 46; In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628; In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611; In re
Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360; In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404; In re
Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220.
16. The petition for writ of mandamus was denied in In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373
S.W.3d 46, and In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301.
17. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136-38 (Tex. 2004); In re
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207-09 (Tex. 2009).
18. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002 (West 2011);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.221 (West 2004); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (West
2010).
19. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.221.
20. Id.; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061.
21. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.002.
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thorized to perform"; or (3) as to rulings of the courts of appeals. 22 Fi-
nally, the language of certain statutes may provide a basis for mandamus
jurisdiction in cases involving those statutes.23
Mandamus proceedings in both the supreme court and the courts of
appeals are governed by Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. 24 Strict adherence to the provisions of Rule 52 is essential.25 Relief
may be denied for, among other things, defects of form in the petition,26
failure to properly authenticate evidence, 27 or lack of a complete re-
cord.28 Further, pursuant to Rule 52.3(e), if the supreme court and a
"court of appeals have concurrent jurisdiction, the petition must be
presented first to the court of appeals unless there is a compelling reason
not to do so."29
As described above, the focus of this article is the particular type of
mandamus relief that corrects a clear abuse of discretion when there is no
adequate remedy by appeal. The supreme court has extensively explained
that:
A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial
error of law." 30 This standard, however, has different applications in
different circumstances. 3' With respect to resolution of factual issues
or matters committed to the trial court's discretion, for example, the
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court. 3 2 The relator must establish that the trial court could reasona-
bly have reached only one decision.33 Even if the reviewing court
would have decided the issue differently, it cannot disturb the trial
court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 34
On the other hand, review of a trial court's determination of the le-
gal principles controlling its ruling is much less deferential. 35 A trial
court has no "discretion" in determining what the law is or applying
the law to the facts. 36 Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to ana-
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., In re Nestle USA. Inc., No. 12-0518, 2012 WL 5073315, at *1, *4 (Tex.
Oct. 19, 2012) (mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute was proper
where legislature used language that gave supreme court power for such review).
24. See TEX. R. App. P. 52.
25. See, e.g., In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 758-59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, orig.
proceeding).
26. See id. at 758.
27. See In re Cullar, 320 S.W.3d 560, 567-68 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, orig.
proceeding).
28. See In re Le, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding).
29. TEX. R. App. P. 52.3(e).
30. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (quoting
Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)).
31. Id.
32. Id.






lyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion,
and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.37
Furthermore, the supreme court has said the following as to the ade-
quate remedy requirement:
The operative word, "adequate", has no comprehensive definition; it
is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considera-
tions that determine when appellate courts will use original manda-
mus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. These
considerations implicate both public and private interests. Manda-
mus review of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial courts un-
duly interferes with trial court proceedings, distracts appellate court
attention to issues that are unimportant both to the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case at hand and to the uniform development of the law,
and adds unproductively to the expense and delay of civil litigation.
Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be
essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights
from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed
and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive
in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the
public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal
of improperly conducted proceedings. An appellate remedy is "ade-
quate" when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by
the detriments. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appel-
late courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is
adequate.38
Thus, "the adequacy of an appeal depends on the facts involved in each
case."39 Further, while "'an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely
because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an ex-
traordinary writ' . . . the word 'merely' carries heavy freight." 40
III. CATEGORIZATION OF RECENT TEXAS SUPREME
COURT MANDAMUS CASES
The sixteen Texas Supreme Court mandamus opinions that are the fo-
cus of this article involve a range of topics, including arbitration, venue,
jurisdiction, severance of a case, discovery, contempt, law firm disqualifi-
cation, enforcement of an insurance appraisal clause, enforcement of a
jury waiver, and the granting of a new trial. This section briefly states the
facts and outcome of each case and describes how the supreme court ana-
lyzed the adequacy of the appellate remedy.
37. Id.
38. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004); see In re Gulf
Exploration, LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2009); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275
S.W.3d 458, 468-69 (Tex. 2008); In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex.
2008).
39. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d at 469.
40. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136 (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842).
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A. MANDAMUS AND ARBITRATION 41
1. Trial Court's Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration
In the case of In re Rubiola, the Texas Supreme Court granted manda-
mus relief after a trial court refused to compel arbitration under an arbi-
tration agreement that was not signed by the parties who sought to
compel arbitration. 42 The case involved the sale and financing of a home
that Brian and Christina Salmon agreed to purchase from Greg and Cath-
erine Rubiola.43 The transaction was handled by real estate broker J.C.
Rubiola, Greg Rubiola's brother, "who served as the listing broker for
the property."44 Additionally, the Salmons applied for mortgage financ-
ing with Rubiola Mortgage Company, a corporation operated by Greg
Rubiola and J.C. Rubiola as president and vice president, respectively. 45
"As part of the loan process, the Salmons executed an arbitration agree-
ment with the mortgage company." 46 The arbitration agreement defined
"parties" as "Rubiola Mortgage Company, and each and all persons and
entities signing this agreement or any other agreements between or
among any of the parties as part of this transaction" and provided that
"'[t]he parties' shall also include individual partners, affiliates, officers,
directors, employees, agents, and/or representatives of any party to such
documents, and shall include any other owner and holder of this agree-
ment." 47 J.C. Rubiola signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of
Rubiola Mortgage Company. 48 Several months after closing, the Salmons
sued Greg, Catherine, and J.C. Rubiola and others involved in repairing
the home (collectively, the Rubiolas).49 The Rubiolas "moved to compel
arbitration."5 0 "The trial court denied the Rubiolas' motion to compel,"
and the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied mandamus re-
lief.51 The Rubiolas filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas
Supreme Court, seeking enforcement of the arbitration agreement as
non-signatories. 52 The supreme court observed that the parties did not
41. It is important to note that in the cases in this category the parties did not dispute
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Section 51.016 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, which became effective September 1, 2009, expanded state
court interlocutory review of certain FAA arbitration matters. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.016 (West 2012). Thus, mandamus relief may no longer be available
in certain FAA cases. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 448-52 (Tex. 2011)
(describing recent changes to Texas law respecting availability of judicial review of
interlocutory arbitration order).





47. Id. at 222-23.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; In re Rubiola, No. 04-09-00115-CV, 2009 WL 542174, at *1 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Mar. 4, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
52. In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 223.
2013]1 1161
SMU LAW REVIEW
contest the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).53 That
court stated "'[a] party denied the right to arbitrate pursuant to an agree-
ment subject to the FAA does not have an adequate remedy by appeal
and is entitled to mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of discre-
tion."54 The supreme court reasoned that "Rubiola Mortgage Company
signed the arbitration agreement, and the Rubiola brothers are clearly
officers and representatives of the mortgage company and thus non-sig-
natory parties to the arbitration agreement under the agreement's
terms."55 Therefore, the Rubiolas were entitled to compel arbitration
under that agreement.56 Further, the supreme court reasoned that the
language of the arbitration agreement indicated it "was not limited to the
financing part of the transaction but rather extended to the real estate
sales contract and the Salmons['] complaints regarding that sale."57 In
light of those determinations, the supreme court concluded the trial
court's order denying arbitration constituted an abuse of discretion.58
2. Appointment of Arbitrator by Trial Court
In the case of In re Service Corp. International, a cemetery operator
(SCI) entered into a contract with Gabriel and Yolanda Serna respecting
interment rights and services. 59 Subsequently, the Sernas filed suit against
SCI alleging, among other things, that SCI had "failed to properly main-
tain the cemetery." 60 The parties did not dispute that FAA arbitration
was required pursuant to the terms of the contract. 61 The contract pro-
vided that an arbitrator would either be selected by mutual agreement of
the parties or appointed by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) upon application of one or both of the parties.62 After several
months, during which the parties were unable to agree on an arbitrator,
"the Sernas asked the trial court to appoint an arbitrator, arguing that
SCI had waived its right to seek an appointment by the AAA."63 The
trial court appointed a former district judge as arbitrator.64 "SCI filed a
motion for rehearing arguing that the contractual provision required that
the AAA appoint the arbitrator, and that the Sernas were responsible for
initiating proceedings with the AAA."65 This motion was denied. 66 "SCI
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 642-43 (Tex. 2009)
(mandamus relief granted where party was denied right to arbitrate under agreement sub-
ject to FAA)).
55. Id. at 224-25.
56. Id. at 225.
57. Id. at 226.
58. Id.
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unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals."6 7
Then, SCI filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme
Court, requesting that court to direct the trial court to vacate its order
naming the former judge as arbitrator. 68 The supreme court observed that
"[b]efore the trial court can intervene and appoint an arbitrator, section 5
[of the FAA] requires that parties follow the previously agreed method of
arbitrator selection." 69 That court stated that the record showed the ap-
pointment in question occurred when "the disagreement of the parties as
to the selection of the arbitrator was at most one month old."70 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, "[a]s a matter of law, a one-month interval fol-
lowing an impasse, by itself, cannot reasonably be construed as a lapse in
appointing an arbitrator."71 The supreme court concluded the trial court
abused its discretion by appointing an arbitrator "without allowing a rea-
sonable opportunity to procure an appointment by AAA." 72 Further, the
supreme court stated that "[n]o adequate remedy by appeal exists when a
trial court erroneously appoints an arbitrator pursuant to [the FAA] ...
because the FAA does not provide for review of the trial court's actions
in state court." 73 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus re-
lief to SCI, directing "the trial court to vacate its prior order appointing
an arbitrator and allow the parties a reasonable opportunity to select an
arbitrator pursuant to their agreement." 74
In another case involving facts similar to those described above, also
styled In re Service Corp. International, two sisters, Norma Sandoval and
Nora Martinez, jointly filed suit against a cemetery operator (SCI).7s The
sisters alleged "tort claims arising from their respective . . . services con-
tracts for family burial plots." 76 The parties agreed the disputes were re-
quired to be arbitrated pursuant to the FAA.7 7 The contracts that
Sandoval and Martinez signed both included arbitration clauses but speci-
fied different contractual methods for appointing the arbitrators.78 Marti-
nez's contract allowed the court to appoint an arbitrator, while
Sandoval's contract required the AAA to appoint the arbitrator if the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 659.
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 661.
72. Id. at 657.
73. Id. at 658 (citing In re La. Pac. Corp., 972 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. 1998) (no adequate
remedy where trial court abused discretion by naming substitute arbitrator)). Additionally,
the supreme court noted "[tihis case was filed prior to the 2009 addition of section 51.016
to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expanding state court interlocutory review
of certain FAA arbitration matters." Id. at 658 n.1; see CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d
444, 448-52 (Tex. 2011) (discussing appellate remedies available to parties in arbitration
proceedings following the 2009 amendment to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code).
74. In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d at 662.
75. In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d 662, 662 (Tex. 2011).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 662-63.
78. Id. at 663.
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parties could not reach an agreement. 79 The trial judge severed the cases
and appointed an arbitrator for Martinez's case.80 Then, Sandoval asked
the trial court to appoint an arbitrator in her case.81 Over SCI's objection,
the trial court appointed the Martinez case arbitrator to also arbitrate
Sandoval's case.82 SCI unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus from
the court of appeals.83 In the Texas Supreme Court, SCI requested a writ
of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order naming the arbi-
trator in Sandoval's case.84 Specifically, SCI argued that the trial court's
appointment of an arbitrator interfered with the contractual rights of the
parties and was not authorized by the FAA. 85 The supreme court stated
"[t]he disputed issue is whether SCI allowed a lapse or mechanical break-
down in the contractual process for selection of an arbitrator, thereby
validating the trial court's intervention to appoint the arbitrator." 86 The
supreme court reasoned that, "[a]s a matter of law, the two-month delay
in the selection of an arbitrator in this case, by itself, [did] not establish a
lapse or failure of the parties to avail themselves of the contractual selec-
tion method."87 The supreme court concluded SCI was entitled to manda-
mus relief because (1) "the trial court abused its discretion by appointing
an arbitrator instead of following the agreed-upon method of selection
outlined in the contract" and (2) there was no adequate remedy by ap-
peal from that abuse of discretion.88
B. MANDAMUS AND VENUE
In the case of In re Lopez,89 members of a patient's family (the
Lopezes) entered into a written agreement with Regency Nursing Center
Partners of Yoakum, Ltd. (Yoakum) for admission of the patient to Yoa-
kum's nursing home. The agreement specified that arbitration relating to
the agreement was to take place in Victoria County. 90 However, in an
action by the Lopezes against Yoakum following the patient's death, the
arbitration hearing took place in Travis County. 91 The arbitration re-
sulted in a ruling in the Lopezes' favor. 92 Yoakum filed an application in
district court in Victoria County to vacate the arbitration award.93 The









87. Id. at 663-64
88. Id. at 663. See also In re Serv. Corp. Int'l, 355 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2011) (no adequate
remedy where trial court abused discretion by appointing arbitrator).
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§ 171.096(c) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which pro-
vides that "[i]f a hearing before the arbitrators has been held, a party
must file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award] with the
clerk of the court of the county in which the hearing was held." 94 Yoakum
filed a response stating that venue was proper in Victoria County pursu-
ant to § 171.096(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which
states in part that if an arbitration agreement "provides that the hearing
before the arbitrators is to be held in a county in this state, a party must
file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award] with the clerk
of the court of that county." 9 5 The trial court denied the Lopezes' motion
to transfer, and the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi denied
mandamus relief.96 The Lopezes pursued mandamus relief in the Texas
Supreme Court, contending § 171.096(b) applies only when there was an
agreement to arbitrate in a particular county and no arbitration hearing
had yet taken place. 7 The supreme court agreed with the Lopezes and
stated "that when an arbitration hearing has already been held, venue is
determined by section 171.096(c), which mandates venue be in the same
county where the arbitration hearing was held.98 The supreme court con-
cluded the "trial court clearly abused its discretion" by applying
§ 171.096(b) instead of 171.096(c) since an arbitration hearing had al-
ready been held.99 Additionally, the supreme court stated "[miandamus
relief is the proper remedy to enforce a mandatory venue provision when
the trial court has denied a motion to transfer venue." 00 The supreme
court observed that "mandamus relief is proper when the trial court has
abused its discretion and a party has no appellate remedy."101 "However,
where a party seeks to enforce a mandatory venue provision a party is
only required to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by
failing to transfer the case and is not required to prove that it lacks an
adequate appellate remedy."102 The supreme court reasoned that
§ 171.096(c) is a mandatory venue provision because it states "that a
94. Id. at 175-76; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.096(c) (West 2011).
95. Id. at 176; TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.096(b) (West 2011).




100. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (West 2002) ("A party
may apply for a writ of mandamus with an appellate court to enforce the mandatory venue
provisions of this chapter.")).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 176-77 (citing In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114, 117
(Tex. 2006) (because declaratory judgment suit to determine rights of parties to contract to
acquire surface and mineral leases fell within scope of mandatory venue provision, showing
of inadequate remedy was not required in mandamus proceeding respecting venue); In re
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (because § 15.0642 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code authorizes mandamus to enforce mandatory venue provisions
generally, requirement of inadequate remedy was inapplicable in mandamus proceeding
respecting venue in suit against railroad under Federal Employers' Liability Act); In re
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1998) (applying abuse of discretion stan-




party 'must' file the initial application in the county where the arbitration
hearing was held." 03 Therefore, the supreme court concluded, "the
Lopezes [were] not required to prove that they [had] no adequate appel-
late remedy in order to obtain mandamus relief."1 04 The supreme court
conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court (1) to va-
cate the order denying the Lopezes' motion and (2) to "grant the
Lopezes' motion to transfer venue." 05
C. MANDAMUS AND JURISDICTION
1. Dominant Jurisdiction in Matter Involving Estate Property
In re Puig involved mandamus relief sought to correct a district court's
denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.106 "The plea challenged the district
court's jurisdiction to determine the ownership of a ranch allegedly
owned, in part, by an estate undergoing administration in a county court
at law."' 0 7 The county court was sitting in probate.108 The Fourth Court
of Appeals in San Antonio denied the relators' petition for writ of man-
damus, and the relators sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme
Court.109 The supreme court agreed with the relators that, because the
issues raised in the district court suit were "appertaining and incident to"
the estate in question, the county court sitting in probate had the power
to hear the ownership matters in dispute in the district court suit." 0 How-
ever, the supreme court determined the issue was "one of dominant,
rather than exclusive, jurisdiction,""' and '[tihe proper method for con-
testing a court's lack of dominant jurisdiction is the filing of a plea in
abatement, not a plea to the jurisdiction .... ."112 The supreme court con-
cluded that "[b]ecause the . . . district court did not commit a clear abuse
of discretion in denying the relators' plea to the jurisdiction, any further
inquiry into the relators' appellate remedy is unnecessary."113 The peti-
tion for writ of mandamus was denied.114
2. Jurisdiction in Interstate Child Custody Matter
In the case of In re Dean, the Texas Supreme Court considered
"whether a Texas court ha[d] jurisdiction over a custody determination
103. Id. at 177.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 303 (Tex. 2011).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 304.
110. Id. at 305.
111. Id. at 306.
112. Id. at 303. The supreme court stated, "We note that the improper denial of a plea
in abatement may, on occasion, warrant mandamus relief." Id. at 306. Specifically, accord-
ing to the court, "when a court issues an 'order which actively interferes with the exercise
of jurisdiction' by a court possessing dominant jurisdiction, mandamus relief is appropri-
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involving a child[, J.S.D.,] who was born in New Mexico and ... lived
there all his life.""15 J.S.D.'s father, Richard Hompesch III, and mother,
Carrie Dean, were married in 2010 and lived together in Texas. While
pregnant with J.S.D., Dean moved to New Mexico, where J.S.D. was sub-
sequently born. In February 2011, Hompesch filed for divorce in Dallas
County and sought orders concerning J.S.D. While that case was pending,
Dean petitioned a New Mexico court to adjudicate custody of J.S.D.
Dean alleged that the New Mexico court, and not the Texas court, had
jurisdiction because New Mexico was J.S.D.'s "home state" pursuant to
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA), which has been adopted by both Texas and New Mexico.116
Simultaneously, Dean sought dismissal of the Texas proceeding. The New
Mexico trial judge concluded that New Mexico was J.S.D.'s "home state,"
but deferred to the Texas court to "make the first call."' 17 An associate
judge in the Texas case "concluded that Texas had jurisdiction over the
proceedings because [Hompesch] filed his divorce petition in Texas
first.""18 Based on that decision, and even though it thought that "New
Mexico [did] have jurisdiction," the New Mexico court dismissed Dean's
pending custody suit without prejudice. Then, "the Texas district court
adopted the associate judge's recommendations" as to custody "and set
forth guidelines for both parents' access to J.S.D."119 Dean appealed the
New Mexico trial court's dismissal order to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, and that appellate court "issued two proposed summary disposi-
tions proposing to hold that New Mexico was J.S.D.'s home state with
exclusive jurisdiction over custody and visitation."12 0 While those disposi-
tions remained pending, Dean unsuccessfully sought mandamus relief in
the Texas case from the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas and then peti-
tioned the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus.121 Following an
analysis of the UCCJEA, the supreme court concluded New Mexico was
J.S.D.'s "home state" under that act and therefore "jurisdiction in that
state's courts is exclusive unless that state properly cedes jurisdiction
based on circumstances the statute prescribes."122 Further, the supreme
court concluded the New Mexico trial court improperly ceded jurisdiction
to Texas without basing that declination on UCCJEA § 207 (inconvenient
forum) or § 208 (jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct). 23 Finally,
the supreme court concluded the Texas court improperly assumed juris-
diction because the New Mexico court had not yet properly declined ju-
115. In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741, 743 (Tex. 2012).
116. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10A-201
(West 2001).
117. In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d at 744-45.
118. Id. at 745.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Additionally, Dean concurrently sought a stay of the Texas trial court's order,
which the supreme court granted. Id.
122. Id. at 746-47.
123. Id. at 750.
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risdiction under the UCCJEA.124 According to the supreme court, Dean,
Hompesch, and J.S.D. were left with an "intolerable interregnum" during
which they, "seemingly, [had] nowhere to turn."125 Without specifically
discussing the lack of an adequate appellate remedy, the supreme court
conditionally granted mandamus relief.126 The Texas district court was
ordered to "communicate promptly with the New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals" and dismiss the child custody portion of the case unless the New
Mexico court "'decline[s] to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
[Texas] is the more appropriate forum to determine [J.S.D.'s] custody ...
under [UCCJEA] Section 207 or 208."127
D. MANDAMUS AND SEVERANCE OF CASE BY TRIAL COURT
In the case of In re State, the State of Texas sought to condemn a tract
of land to be used in constructing a highway.128 After the State filed a
petition to condemn, "the owners subdivided the property into eight sep-
arate parcels."1 29 Then, upon motion by the owners, the trial court "sev-
ered the case into eight different proceedings."o30 The State contended
the severance was improper and sought a writ of mandamus requiring the
trial court to vacate the order.' 3 ' The Third Court of Appeals in Austin
denied mandamus relief.132 However, the supreme court conditionally
granted the State's petition for writ of mandamus. 3 3 The supreme court
reasoned that the duplication that would result from the severance of the
case was "inconvenient, and, worse, prejudicial to the State, which has a
right to offer evidence that the entire property being taken should be
valued as a single economic unit." 134 The supreme court stated:
Because of this, and because of the waste involved in having valua-
tion experts give testimony eight times that they could give once, we
hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a severance
that, by breaking up a deeply interrelated set of legal and factual
issues, prejudices the parties and causes great inconvenience.13 5
Further, the supreme court concluded, "We believe that the circum-
stances of this case also make the appellate remedy inadequate because
of the enormous waste of judicial and public resources that compliance
with the trial court's order would entail."136 The supreme court stated
124. Id. at 747.
125. Id. at 750.
126. Id. (citing Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Tex. 2005) (writ of mandamus is
appropriate means to require trial court to comply with UCCJEA's jurisdictional
requirements)).
127. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(3) (West 2008)).




132. Id. at 613.
133. Id. at 612.
134. Id. at 614.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 615.
1168 [Vol. 66
Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions
that "[r]equiring eight separate suits here, when only one is proper, would
be a clear waste of the resources of the State, the landowners, and the
courts." 137
E. MANDAMUS AND DISCOVERY
1. Pre-suit Discovery
In the case of In re Does,138 the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether a trial court may order pre-suit discovery by agreement of the
witness over the objections of other interested parties without making the
findings required by Rule 202.4(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Philip R. Klein owned two corporations (collectively, PRK).139 Two
anonymous bloggers (collectively, relators) criticized Klein extensively on
their blogs.140 "Relators subscribe[d] to Blogger.com, a subsidiary of
Google, Inc., . . . which host[ed] them on the Internet. PRK petitioned
the district court under Rule 202 to order discovery from Google of [the]
relators' identities in anticipation of a lawsuit by Klein and PRK against
relators for copyright law violations, defamation, and invasion of pri-
vacy."141 "After being served, Google agreed with PRK that it would re-
spond to a subpoena duces tecum."142 Further:
Google gave relators notice of its receipt of the subpoena. Relators
moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the petition's allegations
were insufficient to show PRK had a cause of action against relators,
and that their identities are constitutionally protected from disclo-
sure. PRK responded, arguing that the information sought was not
constitutionally protected, and moved to compel discovery.. . . After
a brief hearing, at which relators did not appear, the trial court de-
nied relators' motions and granted PRK's.143
The Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont denied mandamus relief.144 In
their mandamus action in the supreme court, relators argued the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to comply with Rule 202's require-
ment that the trial court find that "(1) allowing the petitioner to take the
requested deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an antici-
pated suit, or (2) the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the
requested deposition to investigate a potential claim outweighs the bur-
den or expense of the procedure."1 45 The supreme court granted manda-
mus relief, reasoning that because PRK and Google were not the only
parties to the proceeding, they "could not modify the procedures pre-
137. Id.
138. In re Does, 337 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011).
139. Id. at 863.
140. Id.
141. Id.






scribed by Rule 202 by an agreement that did not include the relators."146
The supreme court observed that Rule 202 expressly requires that discov-
ery may be ordered "only if" the required findings are made and con-
cluded the trial court "clearly abused its discretion in failing to follow
Rule 202."147 Additionally, as to the adequacy of an appellate remedy,
the supreme court stated "Rule 202.5 provides that use of a deposition
may be restricted or prohibited 'to prevent abuse of this rule' but that
remedy for noncompliance affords relators no relief from their complaint
that their identities not be disclosed."148
In the case of In re Wolfe, the Texas Supreme Court conditionally
granted a petition for writ of mandamus after concluding that "without
joinder of a proper state official, individual citizens may [not] obtain pre-
suit discovery under Rule 202 [of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure] to
investigate grounds for removal of a county official."1 49 "The Harris
County Department of Education and four of its seven trustees ... (col-
lectively, the Department), petitioned the district court under Rule 202 to
order the deposition of another trustee, Michael Wolfe, in order to inves-
tigate suspected wrongdoing that might lead to a removal suit."' 5 0 "The
trial court granted the petition and ordered Wolfe's deposition." 5 ' At the
court of appeals, Wolfe's petition for mandamus was denied. 5 2 The su-
preme court observed that "[i]ndividual citizens . . . have no right to
maintain an ouster suit without being joined by a proper state official."' 53
Further, the supreme court (1) reasoned that the proper party to prose-
cute the anticipated ouster action against Wolfe was the State, repre-
sented by the county attorney,154 and (2) rejected the Department's
argument that because a Rule 202 proceeding is not a removal proceed-
ing, the county attorney's joinder was not required.'55 The supreme court
stated that "[t]o prevent an end-run around discovery limitations that
would govern the anticipated suit, Rule 202 restricts discovery in deposi-
tions to 'the same as if the anticipated suit or potential claim had been
filed,"' and "[t]he Department cannot obtain by Rule 202 what it would
be denied in the anticipated action."' 56 Consequently, the supreme court
concluded the trial court "clearly abused its discretion in ordering Wolfe
to testify regarding grounds for his removal from office without the re-
quest of the county attorney who must prosecute an ouster action for the
146. Id. at 865.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 420 (Tex. 2008) (party to Rule 202 pro-
ceeding had no adequate remedy on appeal where trial court abused discretion in ordering
discovery)).
149. In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 932-33 (Tex. 2011).





155. Id. at 933.
156. Id. (quoting TEx. R. Civ. P. 202.5).
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State."' 57 Additionally, the supreme court concluded, "[a]n improper or-
der under Rule 202 may be set aside by mandamus." 58
2. Discovery of Privileged Communications
In re XL Specialty Insurance Co. involved a lawsuit by an injured em-
ployee against a workers' compensation insurer, XL Specialty Insurance
Company (XL), "for breach of the common law duty of good faith and
fair dealing and violations of the Insurance Code and Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act."159 During discovery, the employee sought to com-
pel production of communications made between XL's outside counsel
and the insured employer during the underlying administrative proceed-
ings that preceded the "bad faith action." The trial court ordered relators
to produce the documents in question, ruling that the attorney-client priv-
ilege did not apply to such communications.1 60 After XL's request for
mandamus relief was denied by the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas, XL
sought relief in the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that the attor-
ney-client privilege protected the communications in question.161 The su-
preme court observed that "under certain circumstances, communications
between an insurer and its insured may be shielded from discovery by the
attorney-client privilege."1 62 However, the supreme court stated, before
it could reach that conclusion here, XL was required to show that the
communications in question were among those protected by Texas Rule
of Evidence 503, which provides in part that a client has a privilege to
prevent disclosure of certain "confidential communications" made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client.' 63 The supreme court concluded XL had "not brought the relevant
communications within Rule 503's parameters."164 Therefore, mandamus
relief was denied. 65
F. MANDAMUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
IN CIVIL CASE
In the case of In re Reece, a litigant in a civil case was held in contempt
by the trial court and confined for perjury committed during a deposi-
tion.166 "The relator challenged his confinement by seeking a writ of
habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court declined
to exercise its jurisdiction citing, among other things, the civil nature of
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419-20 (Tex. 2008) (party to Rule 202
proceeding had no adequate remedy on appeal where trial court abused discretion in or-
dering discovery)).
159. In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 48 (Tex. 2012).
160. Id. at 49.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 53.
163. Id. at 49, 53; TEX. R. Evm. 503(b).
164. In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d at 56.
165. Id.
166. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Tex. 2011).
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the case." 167 The litigant then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the
Texas Supreme Court. 168 The supreme court concluded the trial court
abused its discretion by holding the litigant in constructive criminal con-
tempt for perjury occurring during a deposition because such perjury was
not an act that "additionally obstructs the court in the performance of its
duties." 169 Further, because the underlying suit was civil in nature and the
Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant the litigant leave to file a
habeas corpus petition, the litigant had no adequate remedy on appeal.170
Thus, mandamus was an appropriate remedy to fix the abuse of
discretion. 171
G. MANDAMUS AND LAw FIRM DISQUALIFICATION
In re Guaranty Insurance Services, Inc. involved a paralegal, Clyde Wil-
liams, who changed employment from the law firm of Godwin Pappas
Langley Ronquillo, LLP (Godwin Pappas) to the law firm of Strasburger
& Price, LLP (Strasburger).172 Williams failed to recognize a conflict and
consequently performed work on opposite sides of an ongoing litigation
matter.173 Trans-Global Solutions, Inc., a litigant that had been repre-
sented by Godwin Pappas in the matter, moved to disqualify Stras-
burger. 174 The trial court granted Trans-Global's motion.175 Guaranty
Insurance Services, Inc. (Guaranty), sought mandamus relief in the Third
Court of Appeals in Austin but was unsuccessful.17 6 The Texas Supreme
Court "conditionally grant[ed] mandamus relief and direct[ed] the trial
court to vacate its disqualification order."177 The court stated that "[t]he
presumption of shared confidences" applicable in conflict-of-interest
cases involving a nonlawyer "is rebuttable if the nonlawyer has actually
performed work on the matter at a lawyer's directive and the lawyer rea-
sonably should not know about the conflict of interest."' 78 The supreme
court concluded the record showed (1) the supervising attorney in ques-
tion "reasonably should not have had such knowledge, rendering the pre-
sumption rebuttable,"179 and (2) Strasburger had met its burden to rebut
such presumption. 80 Further, the supreme court concluded "the im-
167. Id. at 363.
168. Id. at 364.
169. Id. at 369.
170. Id. at 363, 368-77. In its analysis, the supreme court stated, "The parties agree this
Court lacks jurisdiction to grant habeas relief in this matter; we may only exercise our
habeas jurisdiction when the contemnor's confinement is on account of a violation of an
order, judgment, or decree previously made in a civil case." Id. at 369.
171. Id. at 374.
172. In re Guaranty Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130, 132-33 (Tex. 2011).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 133.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 132.
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proper disqualification was a clear abuse of discretion for which there is
no adequate remedy by appeal" and mandamus relief was warranted.181
H. MANDAMUS AND ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS
1. Appraisal Clause in Insurance Contract
In re Universal Underwriters of Texas Insurance Co. involved an action
by an insured against an insurer alleging breach of contract for underpay-
ment of a claim pertaining to hail damage to buildings on the insured's
property. 182 The insurer moved to compel an appraisal and stay the pro-
ceedings, but the motion was denied by the trial court. 83 After the court
of appeals denied the insurer's petition for a writ of mandamus, the in-
surer sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court.184 The su-
preme court concluded a party demandingan appraisal pursuant to an
appraisal clause in an insurance contract after suit has been filed has not
waived its right to insist on the contractual appraisal procedure "absent
conduct indicating waiver and a showing of prejudice."1 85 No such con-
duct constituting waiver was present in this case.186 Further, the supreme
court stated "that mandamus relief is appropriate to enforce an appraisal
clause because denying the appraisal would vitiate the insurer's right to
defend its breach of contract claim."' 87
2. Pre-suit Jury Waiver
In re Frank Kent Motor Co. involved enforcement of a jury waiver
agreement between an employer and an at-will employee.' 88 The em-
ployee signed the jury waiver clause in question "after being told that he
would lose his job if he refused."1 89 "[W]hen the employee was later ter-
minated, he demanded a jury trial." 90 The trial court refused to enforce
the contractual jury waiver and denied the employer's motion to strike
the jury demand.191 The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth denied
mandamus relief, and the employer filed a petition for writ of mandamus
in the Texas Supreme Court.192 The supreme court concluded that
181. Id. at 132 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.
2004) (describing when mandamus relief may issue); NCNB Tex. Nat'1 Bank v. Coker, 765
S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. 1989) (granting mandamus in context of improper disqualification)).
182. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 405-06 (Tex. 2011).
183. Id. at 406.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 405, 410-11.
186. Id. at 410-11.
187. Id. at 412 (citing In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002)
(holding that refusal to enforce appraisal clause would "den[y] the development of proof
going to the heart of a party's case and cannot be remedied by appeal")). However, the
supreme court concluded the trial court's failure to grant the motion to abate was not
subject to mandamus. Id. at 412 n.5.




192. Id. at 630.
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"[m]andamus review is appropriate and necessary to determine whether a
pre-suit jury waiver is enforceable."1 9 3 Further, that court stated "a jury
waiver agreement that is coerced is invalid." 194 However, the supreme
court concluded the employee "did not allege coercion in such a way that
would invalidate the Jury Trial Waiver since an at-will employer's threat
to exercise its legal right to terminate an employee cannot amount to
coercion that invalidates a jury waiver agreement." 195 Mandamus relief
was conditionally granted, directing the trial court (1) to vacate the chal-
lenged order denying the employer's motion to strike the employee's jury
demand and (2) to grant the employer's motion to strike the employee's
jury demand. 196
I. MANDAMUS AND GRANTING OF NEW TRIAL
In In re United Scaffolding, Inc., James Levine sued United Scaffolding,
Inc. (United) for injuries suffered when he fell from a scaffolding unit
built by United.197 The jury assigned fifty-one percent responsibility for
Levine's injuries to United. 198 "The jury declined to find past damages"
but "awarded $178,000 in projected future medical expenses." 199 Levine's
motion for new trial was granted "in the interest of justice and fair-
ness."200 The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for
writ of mandamus filed by United and directed "'the trial court to specify
its reasons for disregarding the jury verdict and ordering a new trial." 201
The trial court amended its order to state four bases, separated by "and/
or." 2 02 One of those bases was "[i]n the interest of justice and fair-
ness."203 United again sought mandamus relief. United contended the
amended order still failed to provide "adequate reasoning" for the grant-
ing of Levine's motion for new trial.204 Additionally, United argued the
record did not support any of the bases in the amended order and, there-
fore, the trial court should be ordered to render judgment on the ver-
dict.205 The supreme court began its analysis by discussing In re Columbia
Medical Center of Las Colinas,206 in which it "held that a trial court's
193. Id. at 631 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004)
(issue of whether pre-suit waiver of trial by jury is enforceable "fits well within the types of
issues for which mandamus review is not only appropriate but necessary" because in no
real sense can a trial court's denial of one party's contractual right to have other party
waive jury ever be rectified on appeal)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 632-33.




201. Id. (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex. 2010)).
202. Id. at 686-87.
203. Id. at 687.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213
(Tex. 2009) (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d at 218).
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order granting a motion for new trial must provide a reasonably specific
explanation of the court's reasons for setting aside a jury verdict" and
"rejected a new-trial grant that was premised solely 'in the interest of
justice.'"207 According to the supreme court:
[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as its stated rea-
son for granting a new trial (1) is a reason for which a new trial is
legally appropriate (such as a well-defined legal standard or a defect
that probably resulted in an improper verdict); and (2) is specific
enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro
forma template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the
particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand.208
Then, the supreme court concluded the amended order in question did
not meet that test.209 The supreme court reasoned that in the amended
order, "the use of 'and/or' leaves open the possibility that 'in the interest
of justice and fairness' is the sole rationale," and such rationale "is never
an independently sufficient reason for granting a new trial."210 Conse-
quently, the petition for writ of mandamus was conditionally granted in
part and the trial court was instructed to vacate its amended order and
issue a new order that met the requirements described.211 However, the
supreme court disagreed with United that rendition on the jury verdict
was warranted. 212 The supreme court stated that "absent the trial court's
having particularized its reasons [for granting the motion for new trial,]
. . . United would be entitled to mandamus directing the trial court to
render judgment on the verdict only if it showed no valid basis exists for
the new-trial order." 213 United had not done so because the record
presented by United was only a "partial one" containing items pertaining
to the motion for new trial.214
In re Cook involved a motion for new trial in a divorce action.215 After
a jury verdict in the husband's favor, the trial court granted the wife's
motion for new trial without stating the reasons for doing so. 2 16 The Sec-
ond Court of Appeals in Fort Worth denied the husband's petition for
mandamus relief.2 1 7 In his petition for writ of mandamus before the Texas
Supreme Court, the husband argued the trial court abused its discretion
when it signed an order granting a motion for new trial "based [only] on
all grounds in the motion."218 While the case was pending in the supreme
court, the trial judge who signed the order in question resigned, and the
207. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689.
208. Id. at 688-89.
209. Id. at 689-90.
210. Id.




215. In re Cook, 356 S.W.3d 493, 494 (Tex. 2011).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 495.
218. Id. at 494.
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case was abated to allow the successor trial judge to reconsider the or-
der.2 19 Subsequently, the successor trial judge signed an order stating his
predecessor's ruling "should remain unchanged." 220 Then, the supreme
court "lifted the abatement order and reinstated the [mandamus] pro-
ceeding." 221 That court stated "the former trial court's order is no longer
at issue here, as the successor trial judge has since issued a subsequent
order."222 Further, the supreme court reasoned that the successor trial
judge's reaffirmation of "the former trial court's order was tantamount to
granting the motion for new trial."223 Consequently, the supreme court
explained, "the successor trial court must provide its own statement of
the reasons for setting aside a jury verdict." 224 Relying heavily on In re
Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, the supreme court concluded
the successor judge's failure to state sufficient reasons for his ruling "was
an abuse of discretion for which there [was] no adequate remedy by ap-
peal."225 Mandamus relief was conditionally granted and the successor
trial judge was directed to specify the reasons for refusing to enter judg-
ment on the jury verdict.226
IV. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE
"ADEQUACY" REQUIREMENT
The cases summarized above illustrate that the Texas Supreme Court's
approach in addressing the adequacy of an appellate remedy varies. In
each of the sixteen cases included in this analysis, that court followed one
of three approaches: (1) specifically discussing the adequacy of the appel-
late remedy; (2) making a conclusory statement as to whether the appel-
late remedy was adequate; or (3) not specifically addressing the adequacy
of the appellate remedy. The chart below sets out those approaches rela-
tive to the subject matter of the cases.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 495.
222. Id. (citing State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex. 1962) ("A writ of mandamus




225. Id. (citing In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d
204, 206, 209-10, 212-13 (Tex. 2009) (where successor trial court judge erred by reaffirming
grant of new trial without stating specific grounds, party had no adequate remedy by
appeal)).
226. Id. at 495-96.
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Severance of case by trial court
(t. ct.); t. ct. broke up "deeply
interrelated" set of issues, thus
prejudicing parties
Constructive criminal contempt
in civil case; t. ct. improperly
used criminal contempt where
court's duties were not
obstructed
Mandatory venue provision; t.
ct. denied transfer of case
necessary to satisfy statutory
venue requirement
Enforcement of pre-suit jury
waiver; t. ct. refused to enforce
contractual jury waiver although
coercion not shown
Granting of motion for new
trial; successor trial judge did
not provide his own reasons for
reaffirmation of former judge's
order granting new trial
Appointment of arbitrator; t. ct.
did not follow method agreed to
by parties
Appointment of arbitrator; t. ct.
did not allow reasonable
opportunity to follow method
agreed to by parties
Demand for appraisal by
insurer; t. ct. denied motion for
appraisal pursuant to contract
where waiver requirements not
met
Law firm disqualification; t. ct.
wrongly disqualified paralegal
where rebuttable presumption of
knowledge was rebutted
Pre-suit discovery; t. ct. failed to
make required findings before
ordering pre-suit discovery
Denial of motion to compel
arbitration; t. ct. denied party's
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While this chart indicates that the supreme court does not frequently
present a detailed discussion of the adequacy of the appellate remedy in
mandamus cases, one should not conclude that the adequate remedy ele-
ment is of little consequence. It bears noting that, as to the two cases in
which the supreme court specifically discussed the adequacy of the appel-
late remedy, research did not reveal prior mandamus cases with similar
fact situations. Further, in each case in which the supreme court ad-
dressed the adequacy of the appellate remedy in a conclusory manner,
the court cited at least one prior opinion that involved a similar fact situa-
tion and contained a more detailed explanation of the adequacy of an
appellate remedy in those circumstances. Finally, there were five cases in
which the adequacy of the appellate remedy was not addressed. Two of
those cases involved a conclusion by the supreme court that no abuse of
discretion had occurred, so adequacy of the appellate remedy was not at
issue. In the remaining three cases, the supreme court cited earlier cases
with similar facts in which the adequacy of the appellate remedy was
addressed.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of sixteen published Texas Supreme Court man-
damus opinions issued during the period of January 1, 2011, through De-
cember 31, 2012, illustrates that the supreme court's approach varies as to
how it addresses the element of whether there is an adequate remedy by
appeal. Sometimes the supreme court provides a conclusory analysis or
Party sought dismissal based on
lack of jurisdiction; t. ct. erred
by assuming jurisdiction in
interstate custody suit
Granting of motion for new
trial; t. ct. did not provide
"reasonably specific"
explanation for ordering new
trial
Discovery of privileged
communications; no abuse of
discretion because party seeking
to block discovery did not show
privilege applied
Denial of plea to the
jurisdiction; no abuse of
discretion because such plea was
not proper method to contest
lack of dominant jurisdiction
Pre-suit discovery; t. ct. abused
discretion by allowing pre-suit
discovery that would have been
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no analysis at all as to that element, and it infrequently provides a de-
tailed discussion. However, regardless of the level of analysis, that court
appears to reach consistent conclusions respecting that element in cases
involving similar fact situations. Further, the case law does not signal any
change by the supreme court in its view that the determination of
whether an appellate remedy is adequate "resists categorization." 2 2 7 Ac-
cordingly, a prudent practitioner in a mandamus proceeding must fully
address the adequate remedy element.
227. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004).
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